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Abstract, _ 
The observed fact that firms invest even if capacities are not fully employed 
does not fit well into most standard formalizations of optimal firm behavior. In 
this paper, the q investment approach is adapted to an imperfectly competitive 
economy where the representative firm is assumed to face demand uncertainty. 
Nominal rigidities and short-run factor complementarity are imposed as sufficient 
conditions to allow for the coexistence of investment and excess capacity. Since 
capacities are underemployed, marginal q is shown to diverge from average q. 
Finally, excess capacity subsists at steady state which makes it more than a short­
run phenomenon. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The observed fact that firms invest even if capacities are not fully employed 
does not fit into most standard formalizations of optimal firm behavior. The 
major part of the literature in investment theory is concerned with perfectly 
competitive markets where prices are market-clearing, thus ruling out any 
excess capacity. This is the case both in Jorgenson's (1963) model and q 
investment models (see Hayashi (1982) and Abel and Blanchard (1983)). More 
recent papers analyze investment in imperfectly competitive markets with 
factor substitutability and price flexibility, allowing the firm to work at full 
capacity.l Investment and excess capacity can coexist if any of these 
assumptions is removed. 
. , 
After the papers of Akerlof and Yellen (1985), Mankiw (1985) and 
Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), the introduction of nominal rigidities into 
monopolistically competitive economies has opened new horizons in 
macroeconomics, allowing for new microfoundations for Keynesian 
economics. Nevertheless, the existence of involuntary unemployment needs 
some type of real rigidity in addition to nominal rigidities. This is a well­
known problem for "New Keynesian" economists. In the same way, 
involuntary excess capacity also requires more than nominal rigidities. This 
point was stressed by Malinvaud (1987) (1989), who analyzes the problem of 
firms operating with complementary factors and having to decide about 
capacities under demand uncertainty;2 if there is short-run factor 
complementarity, capacity is determined by investment decisions, and these 
decisions are taken before demand is known. Thus, if realized demand falls 
below expectations, excess capacity is possible as an ex post undesired 
outcome. 
In Licandro (1990), we stress~d the role of price rigidities and factor 
1 8chiantarelli and Georgoutsos (1990) solve an intertemporal problem in the tradition of 
q investment models where the firm is assumed to belong to a monopolisticalIy 
competitive economy. They show that without nominal rigidities price behavior in 
monopolistic competition introduces a gap between marginal and average q since "...the 
firm...(has)...to lower the price of additional output produced by a new machine in order 
to seU it." 
2 More precisely, in Malinvaud (1987) excess capacities are formalized without price 
rigidity, in which case theyare a desired outcome. 
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complementarity under demand uncertainty for explaining investment 
decisions. The main result was that in our model marginal q is not equal to 
average q. This is so even ifHayashi's (1982) conditions for equality, which he 
formulated for a purely competitive model, hold. The difference between 
marginal q and average q is explained by the expected degree of capacity 
utilization. When the firm does not know demand with certainty, an increase 
in capacities has a less than one for one effect on expected production. 
Moreover, the elasticity of expected production to capacities is a positive 
function of the degree of capacity utilization. This theoretical result accords 
with the observed fact that firms invest even if capacities are not ful1y 
employed, and supports the intuitive perception that the more capacities 
approach ful1 utilization the more firms invest. 
To generate excess capacities, as stated aboye, we require that factots 
be complements at least in the short runo Licandro (1990) has imposed a 
strong assumption about technology, namely a Leontief specification for the 
production function. This assumption allows to understand the investment 
process without having to pay attention to long-run factor substitution effects. 
In this paper the firm is assumed to produce with a constant-returns-to­
scale production function and to face adjustment costs over al1 production 
factors, such as in Pindyck and Rotemberg (1983). The introduction of long­
run substitutability allows for more than the standard average q effects on 
investment. 
Final1y, this paper is related to the "aggregation over micromarkets in 
disequilibrium" approach.3 This literature is based on rationing models and 
considers the economy as the aggregate of a large number of micromarkets, 
each being in a capacity-constrained or in a demand-constrained 
equilibrium. In macroeconometric models built on this approach, excess 
capacity is a natural situation and the degree of capacity utilization is an 
important endogenous variable. In the final part of this paper, it wil1 be 
shown that q investment models under factor complementarity and 
monopolistic competition give formal microfoundations to a particular form 
3 The idea was initially proposed by Muellbauer (1978) and Malinvaud (1980). Lambert 
(1988) introduces sufficient conditions to approximate aggregate production by a CES 
function of aggregate capacities and aggregate demando A macro-model was first 
estimated by Sneessens and Dreze (1986) and now serves as basis for the "European 
Unemployment Programme" (see Dreze and Bean (1990». 
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of the "aggregation over micromarkets in disequilibrium" model. 
2 DEMAND, CAPACITY CONSTRAlNTS AND DUC 
The representative firm is assumed to operate in a monopolistical1y 
competitive market and to face the following demand function: 
c' (1) 
where YD is firm's demand, p is firm's price, P is the aggregate price level, 
YD is expected aggregate demand, and u is a stochastic demand shock, 
which is assumed U.d. with unit mean and given variance. The firm fixes ( 
its price one period before the stochastic demand term becomes known. I~ 
addition, because all firms are assumed to be identical both prices, p and P, 
are equal at equilibrium. 
( The production function, denoted by F(K,L), is assumed linear­
homogeneous in capital and labor. Standard assumptions about marginal 
productivities are imposed. The firm faces adjustment costs on both factors. 
It decides in period t-1 investment and hiring for period t: for the investment 
decision, this can be justified by the existence of "delivery lags"; the labor 
decision is treated in a symmetric way sin:ce the process of hiring also takes 
time. Under these conditions potential output, denoted by YP and 
representing total capacities, is given by 
(2) 
In period t the firm cannot produce more than capacities and yP is thus an 
upper bound on production. 
Under the previous assumptions, excess capacity and excess demand 
are possible outcomes in any given period as long as capacities and price are 
determined one period before the stochastic demand shock becomes known. 
This implies that production, denoted by Y, is 
e 
so that the level of production depends on which of both constraints is 
binding. Let us now define the degree of capacity utilization; this is given by 
---------
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the ratio of production to capacities, that is 
(3) 
e 
As stated aboye, the firm is assumed to face adjustment costs when 
implementing new equipment and when hiring or firing workers, and to 
decide at period t-l about labor and capital for period t. Moreover, the model 
e	 aIlows for underutilization of total capacity. However, nothing up to now 
guarantees that both factors wiIl be underutilized in equal proportions when 
the firm produces less than total capacities: we need to put more structure on 
the problem to have short-run factor complementarity. We thus add the 
assumption that to have different rates of utilization for the two inputs 
entails infinite costs. This obviously implies that the utilization rate wiIl be 
DUC for each ofthem. 
Before solving the theoretical problem, let us introduce some 
preliminary considerations. When there is demand uncertainty, the firm is 
not sure that aIl increases in capacities wiIl be used in production. For this 
reason, the elasticity of expected production to capacities is smaIler than one, 
unless excess capacity were impossible. A better understanding of this point 
can be obtained by looking at the definition of expected production,4 
xs 
(4) Et(y sl =YD s r us g(usl dus + YP sJoog(usl dus ,Jo	 Xs 
YP swhere X s = =­YD s 
and g(us) is the density function for the stochastic demand term uso 
Let <l>p and <l>d denote the elasticities of expected production to potential 
output and expected demand, respectively. They can be derived from equation 
(4) and written as 
(5)	 1 Joo and<l>p,s = E (DUC) g(usl dus 
t s X s 
(	 4 This problem, which has been extensively analyzed, is related to limited dependent 
variable models. In Quandt (1988) the expected minimum condition is studied in various 
contexts. Lambert (1988) analyzes the problem in the context of aggregation over 
micromarkets in disequilibrium. 
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The elasticities of expected production to both expected demand and 
capacities sum to one. This follows directly from equations (4) and (5), and 
implies that expected production is linear-homogeneous in capacities and 
expected demando Since <1>p and <1>d are non-negative and sum to one, they are 
both smaller than or equal to one and at least one of them is strictly smaller 
than one. The meaning of these properties is straightforward. Given the 
demand distribution, an increase in capacities has a less than one for one 
(' 
effect on expected production since the new units have some likelihood of not 
being utilized. The same is true for an increase in expected demand, given 
capacities. But if both expected demand and potential output increase in the 
same proportion, expected production also increases in this proportion. 
A particular case will be important in what follows. As shown by 
Lambert (1988), when the stochastic demand term is lognormally distributed, 
expected production can be approximated by a CES function of expected 
demand and potential output. That is 
1 
(4') Et(y sl = (Et(YDsj"P + yp s"1"JI"· 
From equation (4') we can easily see that the elasticities <1>p and <1>d verify the 
two following relations: 
e 
(5') <1>p,s =EtlDUCs)P and <1>p,s+ <1>d,s = 1. 
The coefficient p is an inverse function of the variance of the stochastic 
demand term u and for plausible values of this variance p is greater than 
one. The elasticity <1>p is an increasing function of expected DUC. From now 
on, we assume that u is lognormally distributed and that equations (4') and 
(5') verify. 
( 3 THE ADJUSTMENT cOST FUNCTION 
The literature on adjustment cost assumes that investment costs depend on 
investment and capital. In this paper, we suggest a slightly different 
assumption, which seems better adapted to our problem. Since the firm is 
assumed not necessarily to produce at full capacity, the degree of capacity 
utilization appears as an intuitive component of the adjustment cost 
function; total investment cost are defined as 'P(I,K,DUC). 
"'.. 
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Moreover, it is frequently supposed that the investment cost function is 
linear-homogeneous in investment and capital. For this reason and 
following the considerations in Licandro (1990), we assume that 
(6) 
Ir capacities are fully utilized the adjustment cost function becomes linear­
homogeneous in I and K, just as is generally supposed. When capacities are 
partially utilized, condition (6) imposes that the firm faces adjustment costs 
which are below full-capacity costs. This assumption implies that at full 
capacity the firm finds it more difficult -in terms of the availability of 
e	 resources within the firm- to implement new equipment than when some 
machines and workers are used only partially. " 
The n (.) function is assumed incresing and convex, and it is 
normalized as follows: 
e 
where DUC* represents expected DUC at steady state. Indeed, the 
investment rate is equal to the depreciation rate in steady state, which 
<. provides a natural point of normalization for n(.). When the firm expects to 
use capacities at its steady state level and invests just to replace the 
depreciated capital, the normalization assumption for no implies that there 
are no adjustment costs, i.e., investment spending is equal to pIBK. The 
(	 condition on n'(B) corresponds to the standard condition for the unicity of 
marginal q at steady state. 
In the same way, let us define the labor adjustment cost function as 
(7)e 
where H represents net hiring. The 80 function is convex and normalized 
as follows: 
8(0) =DJC* and 8'(0) =O. 
( 
The condition on 8(0) implies that at steady state labor costs are equal to the 
wage bill. The condition 8'(0) = O imposes that labor adjustment cost be 
8 
minimum when net hiring is zero. 
4 OPTIMALITY CONDITIONS 
4.1 OPI'IMAL PROGRAM AND FIRST-ORDER CONDmONS 
As assumed above only demand is random and all other variables are known 
by the firmo This assumption allows us to concentrate on the consequences of 
demand uncertainty. Moreover, since random demand shocks are not 
autocorrelated the optimal path for controls is nonstochastic. With profits 
being a linear function of DUC as the only stochastic variable, expected 
profits can be written as a linear function of expected DUC. Let us define 1t as 
( 
"profits at full capacity" and write it as 
(8) 
C· where W s is the wage rate and p~ is the investment good price. Time s 
expected profits are equal to 1ts times expected DUCs . 
At time (t-l) the firm decides about prices, investment and hiring for 
period t in an intertemporal maximization programo Expectations are taken 
with reference to the information set at (t-l) and the optimization problem is 
written as 
(9) 
( 
-
Vt = Max _ I,[P.F(K••L.I- W .e~:l L.- P~~~~ K.] E~l(DUC.1 (l+rr(s-t), 
{ps,Ks,Ls}s=t s=t 
where 
( 
(10) 
PIJ\· E_ (1') Et-l(YDs) = (~ VDs; 
(11) 
( 
9 
(12) 
e with given initial values Kt -l and Lt _l .5 
The Lagrangean for this problem is 
( 
-Llls(Ks- 1s - (1-01 Ks-l) (1+rr (s-t) - LAs [Ls-H s - Ls.~ (l+rr(s-t). 
8=t 8=t 
and the first-order conditions are 
(13) p: aLt-l :'1 0Pt 
_ aEt_l(DUCt) 
- 1tt :'1 + 0Pt 
E [Y)t-l t - O' - , 
(14) 1: aLt-l ~ In' E (DUC l=-Pt t t·l t + Jlt O= ; 
(15) H: 
(16) K: aLt-l aK t 
_ 
-
o. 
, 
(17) L: aLt-l aL t 
_ 
-
O 
. 
Implicit in the optimality condition (13) is, as in Sneessens (1987), a 
price equation where the firm charges a markup on marginal production 
costo The price equation takes the forro.: 
e (18) 
( 
Since labor and investment costs are a linear function of E(Y), marginal cost 
is equal to average costo In determining average cost, the adjustment costs 
are taken into account by the firm as well as the wage bill and the 
5 In order to have more syrnrnetry between labor and capital, one could introduce sorne 
attrition of labor force via an exogenous separation rateo 
10 
purchasing price of investment goods. This equation stresses the inf1uence of 
demand pressures in the markup rate, through the elasticity of expected 
production to expected demand, denoted by <l>d. As in monopolistic 
competition models, the elasticity of production with respect to prices must be 
greater than one, i.e., E<I>d > 1, to avoid infinite prices.6 
Let ex be the investment rateo The optimality condition for investment 
is derived from condition (14) and states 
(19) 
In standard q theories the optimal investment rate is a function of marginal 
q, represented by the ratio of J.l to pI. Since J.l is the shadow price of the capital( 
stock, the variable q represents the marginal q for total capital. However, ip. 
our case marginal investment costs, given by the right hand side of equation 
(19), depend also on expected DUC. This can be reconciled with the standard 
result ifwe divide both sides by expected DUC and interpret the ratio betwenn 
e q and expected DUC as the marginal q associated to the effectively used 
capital. Under these considerations, the rate of investment is a function of 
the marginal q for the effectively used capital. 
Similarly, from equation (15) we can deduce an optimal path for the 
hiring ratio, i.e., the ratio of hiring to total labor. The optimal hiring ratio, 
denoted by ~, verifies 
(20) 
O> represents the marginal value of one unit of labor divided by the wage rateo 
Equation (20) says that the marginal cost of hiring -given by the right hand 
side- is equal to marginal 0>. This is formally equivalent to the condition we 
derived for investment. As in equation (19), the marginal cost of hiring is 
weighted by expected DUC because ocly this proportion of total employees is 
effectively working. 
6 As long as E<l>d < 1, the firm is induced to set very high (infinite) prices. Since prices 
go to infinite, the demand faced by the firm goes to zero implying that <l>d approches unity. 
This is contradictory with the assumption that E is greater than one and implies that 
E<l>d> 1 must verify. 
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Combining equations (14) and (16) we deduce the Euler equation for 
capital: 
( Solving recursively forward we obtain 
(22) 
8=t 
e 
Equation (22) states the well-known condition for optimal investment: the 
marginal cost of investment, on the left hand side, must be equal to the 
marginal value of capital, on the right hand side. It differs from the 
standard condition because expected DUC is not necessarily equal to one. In 
the particular case where the firm expects to fully use its capacities, the 
elasticity <f>d becomes zero and equation (22) reduces to the standard 
condition. But it is an extreme case in which capacities for all future periods 
are so small -or expected demand is so large- that the probability of an 
excess capacity is zero. Note that dividing the right hand side of (22) by plt Kt­
1 (1-8) we obtain a explicit expression for marginal q. 
SimilarIy, combining equations (15) and (17) we deduce the Euler 
equation for labor: 
(23) W tLt-l Si Et-l(DUCtl =wt+l LtSitl Et_l(DUCt+~ (1+rr 1 
FL,tLt 
+ (ptFL,tLt- wtStL~ Et-1(DUCt) - <f>d,t 7t t F Et-l(DUCtl.t 
As for the capital stock we solve forward to deduce 
12 
(24)
 
e 
L(PsFL,sLs- WtSsLs} Et-l(DUCsl (l+rr(s-t) 
B=t 
( 
Equivalently to equation (22) for the capital stock, equation (24) represents the 
optimality condition that the marginal cost of hiring must be equal to the 
marginal value of labor. Dividing the right hand side of (24) for Wt Lt-1 we 
(' obtain the explicit form of marginal oo. 
4.2 AVERAGE Q AND INVESTMENT EQUATION 
Hayashi (1982) shows that, in competitive markets, linear homogeneity in the 
e installation function in addition to linear homogeneity in the production 
function are sufficient conditions for the equality between marginal q and 
average q. Licandro (1990) shows that in the presence of both price rigidity 
and factor complementarity this proposition does not hold, because capacities 
do not have a unit elasticity with respect to expected production. When we 
add hiring adjustment costs to investment adjustment costs, this result still 
holds but a new point must be stressed. 
As a consequence of adjustment costs the hiring process has the same 
type of efi'ect on the firm's value as the investment process. Irwe sum the two 
marginal values from equations (22) and (24), we deduce the total marginal 
value of all factors. It is 
(25) 
(P~Kt-l (1- B) n t + WtLt-lSt) Et-l(DUCtl = L ct>p,s1t sEt_l(DUCsl (l+rr(s-t). 
• -i 
When the firm expects to use all capacities and in the absence of labor 
adjustment costs, equation (25) becomes the standard condition for q models, 
that is 
13 
1 ($::) ~ ( )- (s-t)PtKt-l 1- u 01;(0.) = ..i..J1C s l+r =V t, 
where a. is the investment rate, Le., investment divided by the capital stock. 
Nevertheless, the extreme case of E(DUC) =1 is associated with a zero 
probability of demand constraint, which requires very large expected 
demand or very low capacities. Since capacities are controlled by the firm ine 
the long run and profits are non-negative, in general the firm is interested in 
expanding capacities to avoid too large an excess demand, bounding expect 
DUC away from unity in the long run.7 
Defining average q, denoted by Q, as 
Vt .', (26) 
and taking into account equations (19) and (20), we can derive from equation 
( 
\. (25) the relation between marginal and average q: 
(27) 
where k is the capital-labor ratio and 
- - (s-t) ~ _ ~ <P 1C s E t_l[DUCs) [l+r)(28) w~-..i..J ~ V . 
••t t 
Note that in each period, the elasticity <Pp is weighted by time t profits divided 
by the value of the firmo This weight has the property of a probability 
measure, since the value of the firm is the addition of all future profits. Thus 
~p is a mean value of all future elasticities of expected production to 
capacities and it wiIl be caIled the "mean potential output elasticity."
<:. 
In equation (27) we can see that the neoclassical q model is modified in 
two different ways. First, because the firm faces two types of adjustment 
costs the total marginal value of the firm is given by the sum of both the 
7 Furthermore, as implied by footnote 5, c!ld must be strictIy positive, so that expected DUC 
is strictIy smaller than one. 
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marginal value of capital and the marginal value of labor. Even if the firm 
does not face uncertain demand constraints marginal q differs from average 
q in the second term of the right hand side, which depends on the marginal 
value of labor. Second, the existence of demand uncertainty and capacity 
constraints implies a "mean potential output elasticity" éiip below or equal to 
unity. Without adjustment costs on hiring (ro =O) the results of Licandro 
(1990) hold. Finally, marginal q is equal to average q as in Hayashi (1982), 
when there are no adjustment costs on hiring nor any demand uncertainty 
(éiip =1). 
Combining equation (27) with the optimal investment condition (19) 
and the optimal hiring condition (20), we obtain the following investment 
equation: 
Wt e'(~J(29) p~ kt-l (1- Bl 
In equation (29) investment depends on two terms: in the first term average q 
is multiplied by the "mean potential output elasticity" éiip, -function of the 
sequence of expected DUCs- and divided by time t expected DUC; the second 
term is negative and depends on relative factor prices, the capital-labor ratio 
and the hiring ratio. Note that when there are no labor adjustment costs the 
second term vanish and when capacities are fully employed the first term is 
equal to average q. 
Equation (29) can be transformed 10 have an equivalent expression for 
the hiring ratio. But we cannot deduce a and ~ from equation (29) and the 
equivalent condition for labor, since both conditions are the same. The 
problem is the following. On the one side, we have average q, which follows 
from the firm's total value,. obtained 'by the use of both factors together. On 
the other side, we have two marginal values, one for each factor. As it is 
impossible to separate the contribution of each factor to total value, we cannot 
deduce these two marginal values from the single relation giving average q. 
This appears clearly in equation (27). However, equations (21) and (23) can be 
combined in a different way, and this can allow us to determine the ratio of 
marginal productivities. 
15 
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4.3 MARGINAL AND AVERAGE PRODUCTlVITIES 
We combine equations (21) and (23) to determine the relation between 
marginal productivities: 
FL,t UCLt(30) FK,t =UCKt · 
where the user cost oflabor, denoted UCL, is equal to 
. UCLt =WtL~l 8t Et-l (DUCt) - Wt+l 8t+lEt-l(DUCt+v (l+rr 1 
+ WtetEt-l(DUCt) 
and the user cost of capital, denoted UCK, is 
UCKt =p~ ~l (1- 8) n t Et_l(DUCt)- P~l (1- 8) nt+l Et-1(DUCt+v (l+rr 1 
+ p~nt Et-l(DUCt) . 
As in standard investment theory the user cost of capital can be 
decomposed into two terms: the marginal gain from investing now rather 
than next period, and total current investment costs. The same 
interpretation can be given to the user cost of labor. Consider the particular 
case where the firm expects to fully use its capacities. In this case, equation 
(30) becomes 
Lt-l e' ()0 1 C\Wt Lt 
c\'t- Wt+l0t+ll+r +WtOt 
(30') 
In (3D'), the ratio of marginal productivities is equal to the ratio of the user 
costs of factors. When the firm expects to use its capacities only partially, as 
in equation (30), the user cost of both factors takes a more general formo 
Nevertheless, this general form depends on the assumptions about the 
adjustment cost function: when both adjustment cost functions do not depend 
on DUC, the general solution is equation (3D') even if expected DUC is 
smaller than one. 
Since we assume a constant returns to scale production function, the 
16 
ratio of marginal productivities is a function of the capital-labor ratio k, 
which is determined by equation (30). In particular, with a Cobb-Douglas 
( technology, equation (30) can be combined with the production function to 
yield the average productivities: 
(31) 
(32) 
where ak and al are unimportant constants and y is the elasticity of capital in 
the production function. This is a standard result in production theory: with 
(	 
a Cobb-Douglas technology average productivities are log-linear functions of 
relative factor costs. 
5 THE AGGREGATE ECONOMY 
c: 
5.1 AGGREGATION 
Following Sneessens (1987), let us assume that aggregate demand is given; 
its distribution among firms depends on relative prices and on a random 
( termo Assuming in addition that all firms are ex-ante identical, each of them 
sets the same price, so that the relative price in fact vanishes. This implies 
that aggregate demand is indeed represented by YD in equation (1), and all 
that is left to distribute demand unequally between firms is the stochastic 
term U. This can be interpreted in a simple way: the representative firm 
faces demand uncertainty because it does not know its future position in the 
demand distribution. In this sense, demand uncertainty is just firm-specific 
and there is no aggregate demand uncertainty. 
Aggregate capacities' can be set equal to the representative firm's 
potential output. Furthermore, aggregate production and aggregate DUC are 
equal to the representative firm's expected production and expected DUC. 
Since the distribution of aggregate demand among firms is assumed 
lognormal, aggregate production, denoted by Y, is equal to 
_ (_oP p)oJJ1 
y t = YDt + YPt .(33) 
17 
Aggregate DUC is denoted DUC and <l>p and <l>d represent the 
elasticities of aggregate production to aggregate demand and aggregate 
capacities, respectively. Moreover, aH the optimality conditions for the 
representative firm can be reinterpreted as aggregate conditions. 
5.2 STEADY STATE 
e 
e 
In steady state, capital and labor remain constant. From the law of motion 
for capital in equation (11), we deduce that the steady state investment rate is 
simply equal to the rate of depreciation, Le., a* =0, since net investment is 
zero. For the same reason, from the law of motion for labor in equation (12), 
we deduce that net hiring is zero at steady state, Le., ~* =o. 
The optimality condition for investment given by equation (19) implie,s 
that steady state marginal q is given by 
e 
(34) 
q* = 1. 
Equation (34) reflects Tobin's (1969) proposition that capital does not grow 
when marginal q is equal to one. 
The steady state value for marginal 00 is given by equation (20) and is 
equal to zero, since the adjustment cost function 8(~) is assumed to have a 
minimum at ~ =O, Le., 
(35) 
00* =8'(0) =O. 
( . 
Combining both marginal values as in equation (29) we deduce the 
relation between marginal and average q at steady state: 
( 
At steady state marginal q differs from average q only in the elasticity of 
aggregate production to capacities, which is equal to the aggregate degree of 
capacity utilization to the power p. 
( 
Another interesting relation is verified at steady state. It concems the 
ratio of marginal productivities: 
18 
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(36) 
(' 
Equation (36) says that at steady state the ratio of marginal productivities is 
equal the ratio of factor user costs. As could be expected, the steady state 
value of the user cost of labor is equal to the wage rateo The user cost of 
capital takes the standard form 
( 
(37) UCK* = pI (r1:r
B) . 
Thus in this case the steady state user cost of capital equals financing costs 
plus depreciation costs. Both marginal productivities depend only on the 
capital-labor ratio, denoted by k, since there are constant returns to scal~. 
Equation (36) thus determines the steady state capital-labor ratio, k*. . 
Final1y, we can deduce the steady state value <1> d* for the elasticity of 
e aggregate production to aggregate demand: 
* A* 
(38) <l>d = E (A*-ll+ 1; 
w L* + pI (r + B) K* 
l+r ( where A* = ---:'(------:....:::...:...::......;...):-- > lo 
wL*+pIBK* 
A* is the steady state ratio of the user cost of total factors divided by total 
costs. Moreover, since A* is greater than one and E is greater than one and 
finite, the <1>; elasticity is strictIy positive and strictly smal1er than one. 
Dividing the numerator and denominator of A* by L*, we see that A* and 
thus <1>; depend only on k*, which has been determined above. Final1y, 
DUC* is then positive and smal1er than one, implying that the aggregate 
economy produces with excess capacity at steady state. 
í 
'-­
5.3 THE AGGREGATE ECONOMY 
Under these aggregation assumptions, the aggregate model associated with 
the behavior of the representative firm is presented in Table 1. It is similar in 
structure to the "aggregation over micromarkets" model of Sneessens and 
Dreze (1986). The ratio of average productivities depend on relative user costs. 
Aggregate production is a CES function of (exogenous) aggregate demand 
\. 
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and of potential output. Aggregate prices are set as a markup over marginal 
cost, the markup rate itself being a function of demand pressures. The main 
innovation is in the investment equation. The investment rate depends on 
profitability (through average q and the degree of capacity utilization) and on 
factor substitutability (directly through relative factor prices and indirectly 
through the hiring and capital-labor ratios). Moreover, the firms are 
assumed not to experience any labor shortage. 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
Demand uncertainty and factor complementarity have been introduced in 
the literature to improve the foundations of q investment models and to stress 
the role of the utilization of capacities in explaining investment behavior. In 
Licandro (1990) we have analyzed the relation between marginal and averagk 
q in the case of a Leontief technology. The main result was that marginal q is 
smaller than average q, the difference being explained by the expectations 
about the degree of capacity utilization. As in more standard q models, 
investment was shown to depend on marginal profitability, represented here 
by two variables: average q and the degree of capacity utilization. 
In this paper, adjustment costs on investment and hiring are imposed 
to model short-run factor complementarity when the production function has 
constant returns to scale. Labor is modeled in the same way as capital. The 
introduction of labor adjustment costs implies that labor behaves as a stock. 
When there is no demand uncertainty, since both factors carry with them 
adjustment costs, the value of the firm is equal to the marginal value of total 
factors (capital stock and labor). It implies that, in addition to average q, 
investment depends on factor substitutability, represented by relative factor 
prices, the hiring ratio and the capital-labor ratio. This result does not 
depend on demand uncertainty andc~n be obtained by simply adding hiring 
adjustment costs to the neoClassical q model. 
At steady state, the main result is that capacities are not fully 
employed, implying that firms are induced to have capacities greater that 
expected production. In addition, since adjustment costs on labor are 
assumed to be minimum when there is no net hiring, at steady state the 
marginal value of labor is zero. Since marginal q is equal to average q times 
the elasticity of production to capacities and capacities are underemployed, 
----------------
marginal q is strictly smaller than average q at steady state. In this sense, 
the introduction of long-ron factor sustitutability does not modify the outcome 
of models where technology is assumed c1ay-c1ay. 
e 
For empirical problems this way of modeling firm behavior allows for 
a more formal derivation of the macroeconomic models based on the 
"aggregation over micromarkets in disequilibrium" principIe. The present 
paper has been a first attempt in this direction. In a deeper investigation, a 
formal solution of the difference equation system would be required and it 
would have to be compared with a dynamic simulation of the Sneessens and 
Dreze (1986) model. 
c: TABLEl 
--, 
Factor Productivities 8 
e ln(~:) = ao + (Y-l)ln(gg~:) -1n(DUCt) 
In(I:) = bo + yln(gg~:) -ln[DUCtl 
Production 
1 
Y t = (YD: + yp:l"P 
-- Yt 
DUCt = YPt 
e 
--p
<1>p,t =DUCt 
Prices 
-1 
P t = (l-[e<1>d,t() 
(Wte(~tl Lt+ p~~a.tl K~ DITCt) 
Yt 
(­
8 Since the production function has constant retums to scale, both average productivities 
have the same equation and only the capital-labor ratio can be determined in this block. 
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Hiring, Investment and Capital 
~t= 1_~~1 
n'(CXt) =Qt <Pp,t _ W¡ e'(~t)
 
DUCt Pt kt-l (1-8)
 
e 
Firm's Market Value and <l>p Elasticity 
_ V t-lQ 
- 1t ptKt-1 (1- 8) 
,,-- -(s-t)V t-l =~ 1t sDUCs(l+rl 
s=t 
e 
~ -- -(s-t)

<P _ ~ <1> 1t sDUC s(l+rl
p,t - L.J p,s v 
••t t-l 
Factor User Costs 
UCLt = Wt L~~l el: Et-l(DUCt) - Wt+l ei+l Et-l (DUC t+V (l+rr 1 
+ Wt e tEt-l(DUCtl ; 
UCKt =P~ ~~1 (1·8) ni Et-l(DUCt)- P~l (1-8) nt+l Et_l(DUCt+~ (l+rr 1 
+ p~nt Et-l(DUC t) . 
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